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Inspectorates and Politics: 
the trajectories of school 
inspection in England 
and Scotland
Jenny Ozga and Martin Lawn
Cet article étudie l’influence des changements de la gouvernance de l’éducation en Europe sur les trajectoires des 
inspections et se concentre pour cela sur le système d’inspection de l’Ofsted en Angleterre et sur celui de 
l’inspection de Sa  Majesté en Écosse (HMIE). Pour établir cette comparaison, nous analysons d’abord les 
caractéristiques historiques propres à chaque inspection avant d’envisager les principaux changements du travail 
et du positionnement de chacune d’elles et de discuter dans quelle mesure ces trajectoires sont déterminées par 
les changements politiques nationaux. Nous mettons ainsi en évidence un contraste entre le nouveau cadre 
d’inspection de l’Ofsted, qui cible les écoles aux performances insuffisantes dans un contexte d’accroissement du 
contrôle du pouvoir central en vue d’améliorer les résultats, et la promotion par l’inspection écossaise de l’auto-
évaluation et de l’apprentissage collaboratif dans un contexte où le Parti national écossais (SNP) au gouvernement 
continue de vouloir affirmer l’indépendance écossaise.
Mots-clés (TESE) : inspection, gouvernance, évaluation, politique en matière d’éducation, Angleterre, Écosse.
INTRODUCTION
This paper reports on some of the findings from recent 
research1, where we focus on a group of policy actors—
the inspectorate—who occupy a significant position in 
new governing processes and practices, mediating 
between external and local governing pressures, data-
based evidence and institutional cultures and practices 
(Ozga et al. 2011). In both national systems under dis-
cussion here, inspectorates have occupied positions of 
historical importance, propagating a narrative of their 
independence (from government) and their expert, auton-
omous, professional judgement. In the new context of 
networked governance, supported by data, do inspec-
torates maintain their authority? Does the European arena 
offer opportunities for national inspectorates to strengthen 
their authority? In the development of current inspection 
regimes, is there a trade-off between (political) independ-
ence and power? Our analysis suggests that the two 
inspectorates retain a significant role in the governing of 
education, but that their roles have been seriously dis-
rupted and continue to be subject to change. Their 
capacity to secure their position is heavily influenced by 
the politics in play in their respective contexts: these 
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 present very different opportunities for the enactment of 
inspection, as we attempt to show below.
Our research is framed by the increase in inspection 
activity throughout Europe, and by evidence of increas-
ing and coordinated efforts to internationalise inspection 
outcomes in Europe (Tersmette 2001; Grek et al. 2013). 
In this context inspectors confront, translate and make 
“actionable” the mass of information carried by data 
within and across Europe (Grek & Lawn 2010). They do 
this in situations where the trajectory of their develop-
ment may be strongly influenced by the benchmarking 
and competitive performance regimes of transnational 
organisations, including the EU and the OECD. This influ-
ence re-positions inspectorates in quite complex and 
contradictory ways. On the one hand there is the persis-
tence of performance monitoring at European and (to 
varying degrees) at national levels through target-setting, 
indicators and benchmarks, and on the other the promo-
tion of self-evaluation and “light touch” inspections that 
express a “softer” governance turn, and a concern to 
promote self-regulation or self-evaluation as the best 
basis for constant improvement (Lawn 2006). Our cases 
may be read as distinct strategic choices, in which the 
trajectory of development is shaped by the particular 
politics in play in the two contexts.
Before moving to consideration of the two cases, we 
say something briefly about our methodology. We con-
ceptualise inspection as a site for investigation of the inter-
action of historically-embedded assumptions and prac-
tices on the mediation of global policy trends including 
trends in governance (Clarke 2009; Ozga et al. 2011). This 
requires us to be attentive to history and cultural forma-
tions in different national contexts, while understanding 
that they are trans-nationally connected. We therefore 
undertake extensive analysis of policy texts and interviews 
with key system actors at a number of “levels” of enquiry—
transnational, national, local and school-based. The first 
phase of the research explored the relationship between 
trends in inspection, the work of SICI, and the level of 
national and transnational engagement of the inspector-
ates in our study. The second phase examined national-
local relations as revealed through inspection arrange-
ments, while the third took the research to the context of 
the individual school. Throughout the enquiry we draw on 
critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2001) to seek to 
make visible the relations between text, discursive prac-
tices and wider policy, especially where these connect to 
power relations between policy actors located in different 
policy spaces. The work of analysis therefore includes 
interrogation of official literature and of inspection hand-
books and frameworks, along with a large sample of 
inspection reports (50 in each system); interviews with key 
“system actors” including inspectors, officials, head teach-
ers and teachers at the inter-national, national and local 
levels (90 in total); it also includes investigation of the 
background, training, experience and “assumptive worlds” 
of each national inspectorate. There are also detailed case 
studies of a sample of inspection “events” (four in each 
system) as they unfold, and in relation to their effects on 
the participants. The case studies make use of analysis 
of relevant documentation, and interviews with key actors. 
In this paper, we discuss only a selection of our data that 
relates to the review offered here of major changes in the 
inspectorates in England and Scotland. For further dis-
cussion of the project findings see Grek, Lawn, Ozga and 
Segerholm (2013), Ozga and Lawn (2014) and Grek and 
Lindgren (2014) or visit the project website: <http://www.
education.ox.ac.uk/governing-by-inspection/>
We first consider briefly the history of the Scottish and 
English Inspectorates of education, before focusing on 
the influence of the changing political context on their 
current positioning in the two countries/systems.
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INSPECTORATES IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND
The histories presented here are not exhaustive, but 
focus on critical moments and key shifts in the develop-
ment of the two inspection regimes. This history remains 
a reference point for many current inspectors—even 
where there are breaks and disjuncture in the narrative 
of development (Grek 2013). In both systems we can 
track inspection to its nineteenth century origins, and link 
its emergence to the growing provision of mass educa-
tion, and the need of government to ensure minimum 
standards and effectiveness in spending public funds. 
Inspectors have been significant figures for policy makers 
and teachers, schools and local authorities for a long 
time; they occupy a central—if shifting—place in the land-
scape of schooling. Here we ask: does the history of ins-
pectorates help us to understand why they remain in 
place in the 21st century, and in a very different context 
of governing education?
The history of inspection in England
Some key dimensions of the history of the inspecto-
rate in England stand out. The claim to the independence 
of the inspectorate is central: the distinctive status of 
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His/Her Majesty’s Inspectorate—appointed by Her 
Majesty the Queen through an order of the Privy Council—
created a formal distance from the Board/Ministry/
Department of Education as it moved through its various 
iterations, and that independent status is still explicitly 
referenced in descriptions of Ofsted by Ofsted (The Office 
for Standards in Education, the organisation in which 
inspection is now lodged in England). This independence 
was illustrated in the control exercised by HMI over their 
reporting processes: their reports on the state of educa-
tion were made to schools and to the Ministry/
Department, which had to publish them without inter-
vention. As Kogan put it “No administrator would dare 
challenge an HMI’s report” (Kogan 1971).
In 1839, Parliament decided that no further grants for 
education should be made without the right of inspec-
tion in order to ensure the proper use of public funds, 
and in the same year the two first inspectors of educa-
tion were appointed. Writing in 1960, a former Inspector 
noted that: 
We are still appointed in the same way and have retained 
the title “Her (His) Majesty’s Inspector”. The form of 
appointment derives from Tudor times, and over a cen-
tury it has helped to safeguard and still symbolises our 
cherished independence of judgment (Allen 1960, 235).
In the late nineteenth century in England, schooling 
was heavily stratified into a restricted elite secondary 
education and mass elementary provision, the official 
purpose of which was limited to equipping the workforce 
with basic skills, and the tools of governance included 
central grants, examinations, handbooks of suggestions 
for teachers and inspections. Oversight of the system, 
particularly in terms of its efficiency, depended upon HMI 
judgement. With the exception of financial information 
on levels of expenditure, the system was without data. 
As a result, “HM Inspectorate relied on a strong colle-
giate tradition and shared experience (as well as internal 
guidelines) to achieve reliability and common practice” 
(Maclure 1988, 21-2) and probably focused on value for 
money. In a paper written for a European audience, an 
HM Inspector described the work of the inspectorate in 
England in the post-war years before changes in the 
1970s. The emphasis was on presenting the inspecto-
rate as not a regulatory agency, nor as “political” but as 
acting within the limits of government policy. It offered 
advice but this could be ignored. It had a limited number 
of formal areas to report on and yet might offer, at school 
and national level, a much wider set of impressions:
These reports express the opinion of the inspector, who 
is expected to give his own views without fear or favour; 
in assessing school work he speaks for himself and not 
as a mouthpiece of the government. When, of course, 
he is acting as the Minister’s emissary or representative, 
he must be careful to speak within the range of govern-
ment policy (Allen 1960, 236).
Other contemporary sources underline the respect 
accorded to HMI on the basis of their “prestige, high 
reputation and expertise” that was also connected to 
their style of reporting that encouraged the best schools 
and “gently rebuke(d)” the worst (Kogan 1970, 20). 
Inspectors thus exercised a form of discursive power, 
managed through conversations and reports, which 
reflected their elite status, their professional community, 
and their operational significance as the only body that 
linked disparate sites and practices across the country. 
Indeed the reticence with which the Inspectorate was 
said to exercise its governing power was one of its hall-
marks: it was characterised both by “a deliberate 
eschewing of authority” and also the “subtle way in which 
they use their power or influence” (Kogan 1970, 20). In 
this period (1940s to 1960s) HMI inspected schools 
infrequently, but provided “unbiased expert opinion” on 
performance. They visited schools, says Kogan, “…not 
to issue instruction, but to pass on knowledge acquired 
through the national network of inspectors, about new 
trends of thinking in education” (Kogan 1970, 20). From 
the 1960s, the discourse shifted, and the inspectorate 
became linked to the growth of local schools advisory 
services in the counties and the cities. By the 1970s, 
school inspection was no longer only the work of HM 
Inspectors, as local authorities, to varying degrees, had 
developed their own advisory services.
By 1975 there were nearly 1,700 LEA inspectors in 
England, including a significant number of advisers 
appointed to work with secondary head teachers, fol-
lowing comprehensive school reorganization, and the first 
substantial recruitment of advisers specifically for primary 
education (Smith 2000, 335). So, although an evaluative 
oversight remained the province of HMI, by the 1970s, 
it resembled a national advisory service. As education 
became re-politicised in the second half of the 1970s, 
Prime Minister Callaghan demanded to know: “What is 
the role of the Inspectorate in respect of national stand-
ards and their maintenance?” (Maclure 1988, 157).
By the mid 1980s, the inspectorate’s claims to a com-
bination of professionalism and independence were chal-
lenged in the context of the Thatcherite critique of public 
services and HMI were attacked for their “progressive 
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and often radical” approach (Bolton 1998, 335). There 
was growing government dissatisfaction with HMI reports 
that seemed implicitly critical of Government actions or 
policies (or were presented as such by the opposition 
parties and/or the media), alongside hostility towards 
LEA inspectorates and HMI from influential right-wing 
think tanks, who regarded inspection procedures as inad-
equate, and who also suspected HMI and LEA inspec-
tors of subscribing to “trendy” educational theories. The 
problem came to be identified as a knowledge and intel-
ligence deficit in policy making. Instead of direct attacks 
on the “independent” HMI, the challenge was con-
structed as a problem of lack of evidence: on what evi-
dence were HMI making judgements?
By 1989, against a backdrop of accelerated change in 
the management and organisation of public sector ser-
vices including education, with the encouragement of 
marketisation, increased competition, and the growth of 
quangos and agencies, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate was 
publicly and heavily involved in policy making: its remit 
was much more tightly linked to reporting and advising 
on policy and its implementation across the whole of the 
education service (Bolton 1998). In becoming more politi-
cised, the inspectorate also became more vulnerable to 
challenges about the basis of its evidence and judge-
ment. Its replacement by Ofsted in 1992 reflected the 
changing approach to governing public services and the 
increased suspicion of policy makers that HMI had “gone 
native”.
There is a critical point here in understanding inspec-
tion: it continues over time but may do so in a radically 
transformed condition. In 1992 in England it took a new 
organisational form and a new organisational location 
within the changing architecture of public service gov-
ernance, and its personnel were changed. At the same 
time, the object of inspection shifted towards transfor-
mation of the system of schooling, and this brought with 
it new systematised practices, techniques and technolo-
gies of inspection. HM Inspectors came under pressure 
to demonstrate their capacity to deliver output-based 
criteria of judgement, in line with changes in public sec-
tor accountability more generally. A new governing archi-
tecture, dependent on forms of scrutiny, evaluation, audit 
and inspection took on increasingly important roles as a 
means of managing more dispersed or fragmented sys-
tems of provision. The new arrangements for governing 
schooling, as in many public services, were articulated 
around the principles of “governing at a distance” rather 
than through the systems of integral government depart-
ment bureaucracies.
Ofsted is a non-ministerial government agency that 
commissions private sector providers to carry out inspec-
tions of state schools. It was created because HMI—who 
included distinguished educationalists—were seen by 
reforming governments as elitist, more focused on influ-
encing government than on schools, and vulnerable to 
producer capture. Ofsted came into existence with the 
promise that every school (primary and secondary) in 
England would be inspected within four years, and would 
then receive repeated inspections. Indeed, the centrality 
of inspection to the role and practice of Ofsted was 
embodied in its first corporate mission statement: 
“Improvement through Inspection”. The scope of inspec-
tion also demanded a change in staffing: the core HM 
Inspectorate shrank from around 515 to 300 and inspec-
tions were to be staffed largely through a larger body of 
sub-contracted inspectors, as the inspection process 
was contractualised and put out for tender.
Initially, the culture and style of HMI seemed to domi-
nate, both within the new organisation and in its relations 
to government. However, the appointment of Chris 
Woodhead as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector (HMCI) in 
1994 (he served until 2000) is viewed as changing the 
style of the organisation in a number of ways. Smith 
(2000), for example, describes him as leading a transfor-
mation of Ofsted into a “campaigning organisation”, 
which adopted more or less explicit stances on teaching 
methods, the quality of teachers, the curriculum, and 
pupil performance. He—and the organisation—also pro-
pounded an almost messianic belief in the transforma-
tive power of inspection (despite limited or even contra-
dictory evidence about its impact on improving 
attainment).
However, by 2010, it was evident that problems with 
system steering through inspection remained: more reg-
ulation did not necessarily solve the problem of accuracy 
and reliability of knowledge about school and national 
progress, and the increased cost of inspection did not 
necessarily imply more effective controls (Ozga 2009). 
Evidence grew that schools were “gaming the system”, 
for example by excluding “difficult” children during 
inspection periods, or by sharing information about 
inspectors and inspection. As one of our informants put 
it, reflecting on the need to change inspection 
frameworks:
 …it looked as though we were increasingly getting less 
of a return on our investment. And I think there is some-
thing quite interesting there for inspection systems—
that if you keep them rigidly the way they are then after 
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a while you get fewer bangs for your buck—people start 
to game the system, inspectors may fall back on com-
placent behaviours and attitudes—your system can get 
locked when education generally is moving on (senior 
HMI 03)
The History of Inspection in Scotland
Like its counterpart in England, Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate in Scotland had long been a powerful pre-
sence with influence in policy formation within and out-
side the central education department there. Indeed, its 
history suggests that it was even more powerful than its 
English equivalent, in part because of the small scale of 
the country, while the absence of strong local govern-
ment gave it extraordinary reach into the schooling sys-
tem, and also because a tradition of centralised authority 
in Scotland provided a setting in which the inspectorate 
could exert considerable influence. Some commentators 
have suggested that that tradition expressed dependence 
on central direction, and acceptance of a somewhat 
authoritarian relationship between the inspectorate, as 
a policy elite, and the teaching profession (Humes 1986). 
The quotation below, from a former Senior Chief 
Inspector, conveys their historical role and their view of 
themselves:
 Inspectors promote [Department] policy as a central aim 
of their day-to-day business. But they are also instru-
mental in the compilation of these [policy] documents, 
for their unique knowledge of schools, and their relation-
ship with people in all parts of the educational system 
which enable them to sound opinions freely, and con-
tribute most of the evidence on which the recommenda-
tions are based (McPherson & Raab 1988, 135-6).
McPherson and Raab interpret the history of the 
inspectorate as one of strong positioning from 1945 
onwards, as it had the monopoly of inspection func-
tions—there were no local inspectors. It should also be 
remembered that, in these pre-devolution days, the then 
Scottish Office Education Department looked to the 
inspectorate to provide system leadership, as the central 
department defined itself primarily as an administrative 
unit. This was because Scottish education was recog-
nised historically as one of the defining institutions of 
Scottish identity, and—along with the Law and the 
Church—remained distinctive following the Union of 
Parliaments of Scotland and England in 1707. The UK 
government based in Whitehall took little interest in edu-
cation in Scotland, regarding it as a separate system. 
Within this framework of separate development the 
inspectorate enjoyed the predominant position in edu-
cation in Scotland until the 1960s when “the Inspectorate’s 
wings were clipped” (McPherson & Raab 1988, 148). 
McPherson and Raab associate this change with the 
beginnings of attempts by the Scottish Education 
Department to more actively manage the system as the 
demands on it became more complex: for example in 
planning for new, larger-scale comprehensive schools. 
The role of the inspectorate in these processes is viewed 
more or less critically by commentators: they are seen 
to be agents of more managerial tendencies in the 
Department (Humes 1986, 74) trading their political inde-
pendence for power, and as using their position and 
resources to “bolster their own position” (McPherson 
& Raab 1988, 151).
It is probable that the inspectorate in this period both 
increased its power and became more overtly political, 
as professional and policy divisions about key directions 
increased throughout the 1960s and 70s, and these 
threatened their traditional claims to objective, expertise-
based authority. However the Inspectorate continued to 
be a major force in Scottish education, expanding its 
remit and activities: indeed, the fragmentation of a pre-
viously very standardised school system offered Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Education the chance to claim 
a unifying authority and knowledge that no other group 
could match.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there were consider-
able tensions between the Conservative UK governments, 
the subsequent UK New Labour administrations and those 
responsible for education in Scotland. The Inspectorate 
becomes a presence at an “increasing number of points 
of articulation” of the system (McPherson & Raab 1988, 
494). The political context changes very substantially with 
the (re) creation of the Scottish parliament in 1999, and 
senior HMI were influential in drafting the first education 
act of the new Scottish Parliament in 2000, which placed 
legal obligations on schools and education authorities to 
manage improvement. The Standards in Scotland’s 
Schools Act set out statutory requirements for school 
improvement within a framework encompassing a set of 
five National Priorities (Scottish Parliament, 2000).
However the Inspectorate became implicated in a cri-
sis about examination marks in 2000, and the existence 
of a Scottish government and Parliament changed the 
political landscape and provided an opportunity for the 
expression of some resentment of the inspectorate’s 
dominant role in Scottish education. The establishment 
of the Parliament to some extent undermined the inspec-
torate’s claim to be the champion of Scottish interests 
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against the UK political leadership, and, as “the exam 
crisis provided the opportunity to drive the attack home” 
the Inspectorate lost its policy-making role (Raffe, 
Howieson & Tinklin 2002) and ceased to be an independ-
ent body, becoming instead an executive agency, directly 
accountable to Ministers and not to the Crown. As one 
of our informants put it, reflecting on this period:
We no longer have a formal role in leading policy or 
leading development….when we became an agency we 
no longer have that title.  Formally we give professional 
advice….there could be recommendations and so on 
but when I joined HMI in 1992 I wrote my first speech for 
[the then Minister] within a fortnight. This no longer hap-
pens. We are now notably at second hand (HMIE 03)
However the Scottish Inspectorate seems to have reco-
vered its position in recent years, as the policy context 
in which they are embedded has changed further. The 
election of the Scottish National Party (SNP) government 
in Scotland in 2007 (at first as a minority government, 
and then from 2011 with a majority), sees both a reco-
very and, indeed a movement beyond the inspectorate’s 
traditional role to promote and self identify as “teachers” 
of good practice within Scotland and indeed, within 
Europe.
THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT:  
OFSTED IN ENGLAND
I think in England we have too much data and a lot of 
the inspectors don’t really understand it. …I mean 
data—you can make it say anything you want it to and 
it’s difficult to refute in an inspection, or to say some-
thing different from what the data appear to be say-
ing.…say you are in the bottom left hand quadrant. It’s 
very difficult to say in a report… well yes you are there 
but in actual fact the school is much better than that and 
there are reasons why, but Ofsted will say, but the data 
says this (Contract inspector 142).
Ofsted is currently located in a governing project for 
education that embraces diversity of school provision 
and a process of centralisation/decentralisation to a 
degree that makes it difficult to “see” a system of edu-
cation in England. However, as the system and its 
agents—including inspectors—become more opaque, 
so demands for data, the merging of system data, and 
the vision of education seem in themselves to constitute 
the new landscape of English education. Inspectors, who 
once acted as the source of knowledge for system man-
agement, are now challenged, even superseded, by the 
growing power of system data. This threatens their posi-
tion as policy actors in England and across Europe, as 
well as threatening their constitution as a profession. If 
system knowledge is no longer theirs alone, then their 
work can be disaggregated and different elements of it 
contracted out, including to commercial providers. 
Indeed, their opinions may have to compete with those 
of metadata analysts, think tanks and commercial organi-
sations. As data move between school and centre and 
back again, responses to them are shaped by external 
influences, especially, in the twenty-first century, by 
England’s global positioning, which influences education 
policy by reference to the threat of being overtaken by 
Finland, Singapore and other competitors (Department 
for Education 2010).
That global positioning also affects Ofsted’s represen-
tation within Europe. In marked contrast to Scotland, the 
representation of the English inspection system inside 
the Standing International Conference on Inspection 
(SICI) and thus to Europe has not been strongly pursued 
(Grek et al. 2013). Although a founding member of SICI, 
and with the Netherlands, an important driver of it in the 
early years, the developing versions of the English model 
have not been exportable in Europe. However, the Ofsted 
model has influenced systems in other parts of the world, 
including in China. In the governing of the system, it is 
data and constant comparison that are used to shape, 
reward, exhort and punish schools and to present their 
performance nationally and internationally.
The work of the inspectorate in England, as specified 
by inspection frameworks and handbooks, changed con-
stantly from 1992 onwards, and continues to change. 
Substantial changes took place in 2005 and again in 2009 
when the number of private contractors approved by 
Ofsted to carry out inspections was reduced to just three, 
with the aim of reducing costs and improving inspection 
efficiency (Ofsted 2009). Further change in 2010 with the 
arrival of the UK coalition government of Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats produced proposals for schools 
and teaching in England that currently frame the role of 
Ofsted, and resulted in a new inspection framework intro-
duced in 2012 (Ofsted 2012).
The introduction of a new inspection framework by the 
UK coalition government marks a very significant change 
in Ofsted’s definitions of success and failure. In the new 
framework four key judgements determine how well the 
school is performing: achievement of pupils, quality of 
teaching, behaviour and safety of pupils and overall effec-
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tiveness. There is a much tighter specification of the rela-
tionship between the grades for each category and the 
overarching judgement. The new framework gave much 
higher priority than previously to the observation of teach-
ing and to its evaluation over time: that is, inspectors are 
now required to make a judgment of the extent to which 
pupil learning has been effective over a specific time 
period rather than in a single observed lesson. In addi-
tion, the new framework changed the grades to be 
awarded by inspection from the 4 categories of Special 
Measures; Satisfactory, Good and Outstanding to Special 
Measures, Requires Improvement, Good and Outstanding. 
The removal of “satisfactory” as a grade reflects political 
frustration with the lack of impact of inspection on the 
performance of many schools.
The new Framework and Inspection Schedule bring 
considerable challenges to the role of the inspector, chal-
lenges that were becoming apparent in our research as 
the training process for the new framework unfolded. 
Inspectors are being asked to use “professional judge-
ment” while greatly increasing the number of failing 
schools (an inevitable consequence of the abolition of 
the “satisfactory” grade): they are also asked to “take 
account of context” but value-added data are not per-
mitted: they must assess teaching but have no clear cri-
teria for doing so. There is considerable disquiet among 
the inspectorate:
In the previous framework there was a very clear for-
mula, so if you got this and this it would have to be that. 
This government wants to move away from that formu-
laic approach and build in the professional judgement. 
That said, what we are seeing is that when HMI read the 
report, ’cos at the moment they are reading every report, 
they are questioning the judgements that we made…
questioning the professional judgements (Contract 
inspector 10).
These extracts illustrate the ways in which the power 
of data both creates problems and offers solutions at 
several levels. Data threaten the knowledge-based power 
of the inspectorate and yet data also enable inspectors 
to make school judgments quickly; data enable private 
contractors to manage their performance and increase 
the flexibility of the inspectors that they employ; data 
bypass the hierarchical structures of governing educa-
tion and yet allow coordination of an increasingly com-
plex landscape of public-private education provider 
hybrids and multiple school types (Ozga 2013). In this 
complex and contradictory landscape, the trajectory of 
the inspectorate is shaped by the demands on them: 
their role is redefined as the servants of data and as the 
“shock troops” of a data driven system. Is this a suffi-
cient basis for the future of Ofsted? A senior inspector, 
considering the implications of the increased role and 
accessibility of data for the future of inspection, sug-
gested that it might not be:
 I do ask myself whether what you might describe as old 
fashioned inspection is going to quite have the same 
power…. because we’re putting more information out all 
the time about the performance of schools—and that’s 
another thing this government has done—to make all 
this data available—and—if that becomes more regu-
larly used and you get a kind of “trip adviser” view of 
how schools are doing—you might think, well—pretty 
imperfect that. The problem is however imperfect it is it 
could leave inspection standing [still] (senior HMI 03).
THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT:  
EDUCATION SCOTLAND
There is evidence of divergence in education policy 
between Scotland and England from the late 1970s 
onwards, when the Conservative-controlled UK adminis-
trations re-made education in line with market principles. 
However whereas England introduced a National 
Curriculum with National Testing and a strong focus on 
hard performance indicators, these approaches were 
successfully resisted in Scotland. Scotland did not create 
a data-driven system and the Scottish Inspectorate conti-
nued to be recruited from a professional base of teachers 
even in its period of diminished autonomy: it did not 
recruit from, or make use of, commercial agencies. These 
factors established conditions that enabled the rapid 
recovery of the Scottish inspectorate’s role and position, 
albeit in a rather different mode.
The Scottish National Party (SNP) government in 
Scotland brought about considerable change in the style 
of government (Arnot & Ozga 2010). Decentralisation is 
a key principle of the SNP’s redesign of governance in 
Scotland; it is promoted as a way of building an inde-
pendent Scottish state. The SNP government argue that 
decentralisation demonstrates maturity in the political 
process, developing from political devolution, and ena-
bles the growth of accountability and hence trust between 
government and its partners, local authorities and other 
stakeholders. The SNP Government, a majority govern-
ment since the May 2011 election, has attempted to 
“craft a narrative” of joint or collective learning that con-
nects to growing national capacity and independence 
through education. Expert judgment, evidence, the 
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 building of trust and constant learning from self-evalua-
tion are referenced as elements in building this capacity, 
not only in relation to education/learning policy and insti-
tutions, but more broadly as a key support for govern-
ing. In this context the Inspectorate are once again sig-
nificant policy actors: they carry the self-evaluation 
agenda into a receptive European space, and they model 
and “teach” self-evaluation within the national space.
The Scottish government is actively pro-European, and 
seeks to discursively re-position “smarter Scotland” 
alongside selected small, social democratic states in 
Europe, especially Norway and Sweden, and to use 
Europe as a platform for the projection of a distinctive 
Scottish identity (Grek &  Ozga 2010). The Scottish 
inspectorate takes advantage of this external platform 
to explain the “distinctiveness of Scotland” to Europe, 
and to promote Scotland’s approach to self-evaluation 
as “in line with evolving European-wide models” (HMIe3). 
They are actively involved in developing inspection 
regimes as inspection grows in significance within 
Europe, and this is reflected in their very active partici-
pation in the Standing International Conference of 
Inspectorates (SICI). Scotland has provided two 
Presidents of SICI and the growth of international com-
parison especially through PISA has provided it with a 
stronger role in interpreting and translating international 
data across and within systems.
An indicator of Scottish influence is the SICI Inspection 
Academy, and there is evidence of more formal, contrac-
tual “consultancy” work, through which Scotland has 
been “teaching” self-evaluation to Europe: 
...individual countries within that group being aware that 
Scotland was doing something they found quite inter-
esting and productive and constructive. And they came 
to us and were interested. And therefore we’ve had this 
dialogue… (HMIe 05).
The key policy technology that the Scottish inspecto-
rate has promoted in Europe and within Scotland is 
school self-evaluation (SSE) as set out in the key text 
“How Good is our School” (HGIOS): 
Scotland is certainly one of the early pioneers of self-
evaluation—the thing that attracted so much attention 
to the system here was just the way HGIOS was pro-
duced as very school-focused, schools found it easy to 
use, accessible—an easy way of capturing data—so 
HGIOS has been very much discussed and the momen-
tum often translated—whereas other inspectorates—as 
in England—have tended to produce things that were 
written as inspection guidelines (HMIe 01) (emphasis in 
original).
Within Scotland, as well as externally, SSE has provided 
the inspectorate with a means of recovering its status and 
role, and offered a new way in which they can shape the 
system. School self-evaluation seeks to create a school 
evaluation framework that brings about constant com-
parison and improvement, broadly focusing on answering 
two key questions about educational practice: “How good 
are we now?” in order to identify strengths and develop-
ment needs in key aspects of teachers’ work and the 
impact it has on learners; and “How good can we be?” 
in order to set priorities for improvement. HGIOS posi-
tions the inspectors as guides and enablers of quality 
assurance processes that are built and maintained by the 
school. This enables a shift to the apparent “light touch” 
of new inspection practices, while co-opting schools fur-
ther into the new networks of knowledge production. 
Furthermore, this knowledge becomes productive for the 
constant improvement not only of the individual school, 
but for the governing of the system as a whole.
The growth of self-evaluation has been supported by 
development of inspection practices that stress schools’ 
responsibility for their continuous quality monitoring, eval-
uating and reporting processes, and recast the Scottish 
Inspectorate as “teachers” of the system, modelling 
through their own practice and expert judgment the quali-
ties that good teachers should develop and display. This 
development is promoted by the Scottish government as 
a shift from central control to deregulation, and is con-
nected to the promotion of the government as a “learn-
ing government”, working in concert with its partners and 
thus creating more confident individuals that have the 
capacity for political independence. The current position-
ing of the inspectorate in Scotland seems to be quite 
closely aligned with this governing “narrative” of the SNP 
government which is, in turn, built around the idea of col-
lective learning that provides a resource for strengthened 
national identity, growing national capacity and hence 
political independence. The inspectorate thus has a very 
important role to play as “translators” of this narrative into 
practice through their use of judgement, evidence, and 
the building of trust through self evaluation, which they 
propagate as a key resource for better public sector man-
agement and accountability, while they model and “teach” 
self-evaluation within the national policy space.
HGIOS positions the inspectorate as guides and ena-
blers of quality assurance processes that are built and 
maintained by the school, using HMIE guidance. Self-
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evaluation, then, builds towards system “greatness” 
through inspection: 
 [I]nspection is part of that self-evaluation…. [W]hat the 
inspection is providing is the mirror of a national per-
spective against which a school can reflect its own per-
formance (HMIe 02).
In 2011 a new body—Education Scotland—was crea-
ted, combining The Scottish Inspectorate (HMIE) with 
Learning and Teaching Scotland (the former curriculum 
development agency) and thus heavily underlining the 
alignment of inspection with improvement. The role of 
the inspectorate in this new alignment is to “gather intel-
ligence, advise and intervene” to support a “learning sys-
tem through which the professionals at the front line 
create the forward planning and the forward movement” 
in a system described by a senior policy actor as:
 …much more based on schools being the primary 
agent of self-evaluation, with what we tend to describe 
as a kind of peer coaching that we bring in with inspec-
tion for schools, rather than an external evaluation of 
schools (HMIe 07).
At the same time, inspection has continued to empha-
sise building good relations with local schools and local 
authorities in the drive for improvement. The develop-
ment of a partnership view of inspection places a pre-
mium on support and developmental practices, reinfor-
ced by psychological training that seeks to develop 
appropriate skills:
 We’re training our people quite actively in the social 
skills of inspection… we’ve got some occupational psy-
chologists working with us to develop this framework—
working on relationships with people—we must be able 
to win the support and constructive interest that will 
enable initiative (HMIe 03).
In fact:
 ...how you inspect is almost more important than being 
right, in terms of making the judgments. I remember one 
time, 20 years ago, the absolute—getting the judgment 
right was what mattered, nothing else—whereas now it’s 
the social skills of being able to manage inspection to 
the point where you leave the school actually able to 
improve because they accept and are with you on the 
agenda—that’s the real skill of inspection (HMIe 03).
Self evaluation thus represents and encapsulates a 
new governing idea and has laid the foundations for the 
next stage in the trajectory of development of an intelli-
gence-led, proportionate inspection system that oper-
ates in a “performance-coaching” way. This view of their 
role is promoted by the inspectorate as a progressive 
programme of reform based on peer-led learning and the 
creation of professional learning communities with the 
aim of decentralising learning and promoting innovation. 
The motto of the new Scottish inspection system is “to 
live the talk” of being self-evaluative, hence to constantly 
be looking at international benchmarking and the best 
systems elsewhere. According to this new agenda, the 
role of the inspectorate is to build from the bottom, invest 
in capacity for front line professionals and steer from the 
top in a light way:
This is no micro-management, quite the opposite of 
that… Education Scotland has the role of choreograph-
ing and managing careful balance of pressure and sup-
port from the sides (HMIe 02).
CONCLUSION
Our intention in this paper is to illustrate the trajecto-
ries of the two inspection systems, in England and 
Scotland, in their distinctive political and policy contexts. 
Through most of the twentieth century challenges to their 
role in their education systems were contained within 
their national borders, but this is no longer the case. The 
influence of increasingly complex comparative data and 
the consequent pressures for shared policy solutions 
mean that challenges to historically-embedded positions 
often arrive from elsewhere at a speed and on a scale 
that demand transnational and international referencing, 
exchange and action. The positioning of the two inspec-
torates in Europe and the global arena, although different, 
supports their continuing existence. From the Scottish 
inspectorate’s European and SICI-based influence to glo-
bal marketing of Ofsted’s model to developing countries, 
it is clear that international influence helps to maintain 
and shape the national influence of inspectorates.
European education systems have moved towards gov-
erning through performance management and apparently 
objective, data based knowledge that increases trans-
parency and thus away from earlier forms of governing 
through judgment and highly contextualised knowledge, 
but significant differences in the degree of this shift 
remain. The ways in which national systems deal with 
the rise of data, comparison and calculability and their 
use to control and shape behaviour (Lawn 2006) is cru-
cial to our understanding of system governing, and to 
the place of inspection regimes within the governing of 
education. It is often argued that the key to new govern-
ing lies in inculcating norms and values through which 
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external regulatory mechanisms transform the conduct 
of organisations and individuals in their capacity as “self-
actualising” agents, so as to achieve political objectives 
through “action at a distance” (Miller & Rose 2008, 1). In 
the case of Scotland, the power of data has been domes-
ticated and integrated into a national narrative of improve-
ment, in which the national endeavour is harnessed and 
mentored by the inspectors, and data themselves play 
a secondary role. In England, the power of data has been 
unleashed to define and judge performance and also to 
govern an increasingly heterogeneous agglomeration of 
schools and drive choice in an education marketplace. 
Ofsted’s trajectory of development in this “systemless 
system” (Lawn 2013) is harder to discern: the inspector-
ate is vulnerable to political pressure and faces an uncer-
tain future. Both inspection regimes are heavily implicated 
in seeking solutions to governing problems: what our 
research demonstrates is that the place of inspection in 
governing is not static, and changes according to the 
definition of the problems it is asked to address. These 
vary, but they are always governing problems.
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NOTES
1 “Governing by Inspection: Governance and School Inspection In 
England, Scotland and Sweden ESRC RES 062 23 2241A”. The 
authors acknowledge the support of their Research Council. The 
views expressed in this paper are their own and not necessarily those 
of the Council. For further information on the project see <www.edu-
cation.ox.ac.uk/governing-by-inspection/>
2 We protect the anonymity of our informants by referring only to their 
roles: contract inspectors work for one of the providers (SERCO, 
TRIBAL or CfBT) who are contracted to provide the bulk of inspec-
tion services in England.
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